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Ultramercial and Prometheus:

How Transformation Analysis After Bilski Is Changing to Accommodate Modern
Technologies
by Sarah Beth Smith1
1

I.

Introduction

In Bilski v. Kappos,2 the Supreme Court held
the Federal Circuit’s “machine-or-transformation
test” as a useful, but not exclusive, tool in
determining patent eligibility under §101 of the
Patent Act.3 Although the test has been criticized as
being unclear and inappropriate in some situations,4
the machine-or-transformation test does provide
some concrete and sensible framework for courts to
determine the vague and ethereal issue of whether
1. Sarah Beth Smith is a 2013 J.D. candidate at American
University - Washington College of Law. She currently works
as a student attorney at the Glushko-Samuelson Intellectual
Property Law Clinic and is interested in intellectual property
and health law. She holds a B.S.P.H. in Biostatistics from the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Sarah Beth would
like to thank Professor Jonas Anderson for his help on this
article.
2. 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
3. Id. at 3227 (“This Court’s precedents establish that the
machine-or-transformation test is a useful and important clue,
an investigative tool, for determining whether some claimed
inventions are processes under § 101. The machine-ortransformation test is not the sole test for deciding whether an
invention is a patent-eligible ‘process.’”).
4. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley et. al., Life After Bilski,
63 Stan. L. Rev. 1315, 1324, 1338 (2011) (“Application of
the transformation prong of the machine-or-transformation
test produces even more bizarre results. What does it mean
to transform something ‘to another state or thing’? . . . . The
problem is that the machine-or-transformation test simply
asks the wrong question. For example, in Comiskey, the
arbitration process was unpatentable not because it lacked a
computer, but because the claim embraced countless arbitration
arrangements untied to any practical application of their idea.
The application claimed too much.”); Matthew Moore, In Re
Bilski and the “Machine-or-Transformation” Test: Receding
Boundaries for Patent-Eligible Subject Matter, 2010 Duke L.
& Tech. Rev. i, 7 (2010) (“While the purpose of the machineor-transformation test is clear—‘the prevention of pre-emption
of fundamental principles’—the current doctrine leaves
many important questions unanswered.”) (citations omitted);
Brian P. Murphy & Daniel P. Murphy, Bilski’s “Machine-orTransformation” Test: Uncertain Prognosis for Diagnostic
Methods and Personalized Medicine Patents, 20 Fordham
Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 755, 774–75 (2010) (“In our
view, the mandatory machine-or-transformation test caused
the court to strain unnecessarily to try to fit a square peg
into a round hole by arguing that the claims are methods of
treatment. . . . It would have been simpler and more effective
had the court applied the analysis required by the Fundamental
Principles Exception.”).

an invention is an abstract idea, law of nature, or
natural phenomenon.5 Moreover, the test seems to
provide certainty and consistency in interpreting
patent eligibility of processes under §101, with
a few exceptions.6 This paper summarizes how
federal courts and the Board of Patent Appeals
and Interferences (BPAI) have interpreted the
“transformation” prong of the machine-ortransformation test after Bilski and examines its
limitations in Ultramercial and Prometheus.
II.
Patent Eligibility and the Machine-or-		
Transformation Test
Section §101 of the Patent Act explains
what constitutes eligible subject matter for patent
protection. “Whoever invents or discovers any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefore,
subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.”7 Courts have said that they will not read
in limitations into this section that Congress did
5. See, e.g., Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3218, 3230–31; Fort
Props., Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC, 671 F.3d 1317, 1319–
20, 1323–24 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding that the patent failed
the machine-or-transformation test and was an abstract idea
ineligible for patentability).
6. Compare Fort Props., Inc., 671 F.3d at 1319–20, 1323–
24 (holding the patent failed the machine-or-transformation
test and was an abstract idea), CyberSource Corp. v. Retail
Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding
the patent failed the machine-or-transformation test and was
an abstract idea), and CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty.
Ltd., 768 F. Supp. 2d 221, 233–35 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d, 685
F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012), reh’g en banc granted, 2012
WL 4784336 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding the patent failed the
machine-or-transformation test and was an abstract idea), with
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Lab., Inc., 132 S.
Ct. 1289, 1296, 1303, 1305 (2012) (holding the patent passed
the machine-or-transformation test, but was merely a law of
nature), and Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, CV 09-06918
RGK, 2010 WL 3360098, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2010)
appeal reinstated, 413 F. App’x 276 (Fed. Cir. 2011), rev’d,
657 F.3d 1323, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding the patent failed
the machine-or-transformation test, but was not an abstract
idea).
7. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
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not express,8 but they have also found that there
are three categories of subject matter excluded
from patentability: abstract ideas, laws of nature,
and natural phenomena.9 However, all inventions
operate via natural laws and phenomena and
emanate from abstract ideas, so courts have been
forced to set a line somewhere.10 Moreover, the
Court in Diamond v. Chakrabarty11 stated that the
meaning of the term “process” in §101 is narrower
than its ordinary meaning because of the inability
to patent fundamental principles12 that are supposed
to be “free to all men and reserved exclusively to
none.”13
Three Supreme Court decisions in the 1970s
and 1980s represent instrumental precedent on how
courts view subject matter eligibility today.14 In
Gottschalk v. Benson,15 the Court deemed a process
that converted binary coded decimal numerals to
pure binary code using a general-purpose digital
computer patent ineligible because it would, in
effect, patent an abstract idea and preempt all uses
of the formula, even though it qualified as novel and
nonobvious.16 The Court noted, “The mathematical
formula involved here has no substantial practical
application except in connection with a digital
computer, which means that if the judgment below
is affirmed, the patent would wholly preempt the
mathematical formula and in practical effect would
be a patent on the algorithm itself.”17
In Parker v. Flook,18 the Court also deemed
a method of updating an alarm limit in a catalytic
converter using an algorithm patent ineligible.19
The Court admitted that the patent covered a
“broad range of potential uses of the method . .
8. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
9. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981) (“This

Court has undoubtedly recognized limits to § 101 and
every discovery is not embraced within the statutory terms.
Excluded from such patent protection are laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas. ‘An idea of itself is
not patentable.’ ‘A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental
truth; an original cause; a motive; these cannot be patented,
as no one can claim in either of them an exclusive right.’”)
(citations omitted).
10. See id. (finding a principal unpatentable).
11. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
12. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588–89 (1978).
13. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309 (quoting Funk Brothers
Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948)).
14. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1298–1302 (2012).
15. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
16. Id. at 71–72.
17. Id.
18. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588–89 (1978)
19. Id. at 584.
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. [but not] every conceivable application of the
formula.”20 Although this method did not wholly
preempt all uses of the algorithm like in Benson,
the “post-solution” activity of adjusting the alarm
limit after performing the formula was not sufficient
to transform the process from unpatentable to
patentable.21 The Court noted that the patent
application in Benson did not explain how to select
the variables used in the formula, disclose the
chemical processes at work, or divulge the means of
setting off or adjusting the alarm.22 The fact that the
application only disclosed a method for updating an
alarm limit was important in the Court’s decision.23
When discussing respondent’s argument that the
Court impermissibly intertwined §101 with other
requirements for patentability, the Court stated that
a process implementing a principle in a particular
application does not automatically qualify as patent
eligible.24 The Court further noted that it did not
dissect the components of the patent, but instead it
assumed that the mathematical algorithm resided in
the prior art so that the process as a whole included
no patentable invention.25
However, the Court found that the method
for curing rubber using a mathematical formula
was patent-eligible in Diamond v. Diehr.26 The
patent application disclosed the use of the wellknown Arrhenius equation for use in the process
of rubber curing, which the Court determined was
not “preempt[ing] the use of that equation . . .
rather, they seek only to foreclose from others the
use of that equation in conjunction with all of the
other steps in their claimed process.”27 The Court
noted the inappropriateness of dissecting the claims
into old and new elements and then ignoring old
elements in the §101 analysis. It also warned lower
courts not to confuse the subject matter inquiry with
novelty and non-obviousness, the requirements of
patentability.28
In 2008, the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit declared that the “machine-or-transformation
test,” which had its origins in Benson and Diehr,29
Id. at 586.
Id. at 590–91.
Id. at 586.
Id. at 594–95.
Parker, 437 U.S. at 593.
Id. at 584, 592.
450 U.S. 175 (1981).
Id. at 187.
Id. at 188.
Id. at 184 (“Recently, in Gottschalk v. Benson, we
repeated the above definition recited in Cochrane v. Deener,
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
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was the sole test for determining patent eligibility
under §101 in In re Bilski.30 The two-pronged
machine-or-transformation test determines that a
patent can be eligible for patenting under §101 if
(1) the claim is tied to a particular machine, or (2)
the claim transforms an article into a different state
or thing.31 The patent at issue in In re Bilski was a
method for hedging risk in commodities trading,
particularly in energy.32 The Federal Circuit held
the patent ineligible because the claim did not
transform an article and the applicants conceded that
the process was not limited to a specific machine or
apparatus.33 In analyzing the first prong of the test,
the Federal Circuit noted, “[t]he transformation must
be central to the purpose of the claimed process.”34
As to what sufficiently constitutes transformable
“articles,” the court held that transformations
of physical objects using chemical or physical
processes sufficiently pass the test and qualify
as patent-eligible subject matter.35 However,
when explaining how to deal with electronic
transformations of data, the court cited its decision
in In re Abele,36 which explained that the claim for
the transformation of data representing physical
objects into a visual display was sufficiently narrow
to qualify as patent eligible under §101, even though
the physical object underlying the data was not
transformed in the process.37 Moreover, the Federal
Circuit stated that adding a mere data gathering step
to a claim dealing with electronic transformation of
data could not make it patent eligible.38
adding: ‘Transformation and reduction of an article ‘to a
different state or thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a
process claim that does not include particular machines.’”)
(citations omitted).
30. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
31. Id. at 961–62.
32. Claim 1 of the patent application reads: “A method for
managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity sold by
a commodity provider at a fixed price comprising the steps of:
(a) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity
provider and consumers of said commodity wherein said
consumers purchase said commodity at a fixed rate based upon
historical averages, said fixed rate corresponding to a risk
position of said consumer; (b) identifying market participants
for said commodity having a counter-risk position to said
consumers; and (c) initiating a series of transactions between
said commodity provider and said market participants at a
second fixed rate such that said series of market participant
transactions balances the risk position of said series of
consumer transactions.” Id. at 949.
33. Id. at 962.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
37. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962–63.
38. Id. at 963.

The Federal Circuit also discarded two
previous tests used in the §101 inquiry when it
deemed the machine-or-transformation test the sole
test for patent eligibility in In re Bilski.39 Created
and polished in three prior Federal Circuit decisions,
the Freeman-Walter-Abele test examined patent
eligibility through a two-step process.40 First, a
court would determine whether the claim listed an
algorithm falling within the meaning of Benson.41
If so, the court would then move to the second step
and consider whether the algorithm is “applied in
any manner to physical elements or process steps.”42
The State Street test, first described in Alappat,
inquired whether the process created a “useful,
concrete, and tangible result.”43 The Federal Circuit
deemed both tests inadequate in the §101 subject
matter inquiry.44
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in
In re Bilski in 2010 and affirmed the holding, but
for different reasons.45 The Court stated that the
machine-or-transformation test did not represent the
sole test for patent eligibility under §101, but rather
a “useful and important clue.”46 Although the Court
refused to reject Bilski’s patent due to its failure
under the machine-or-transformation test47 or a
categorical exclusion of all business methods under
§101,48 the Court did hold that the claims describe
an abstract concept or algorithm, which does not
qualify as patent eligible under Benson, Flook, and
Diehr.49
III.

How Courts and the BPAI Have Used and
Interpreted the “Transformation” Prong,
Post-Bilski

After Bilski, federal courts and the BPAI
have continued to use the machine-or-transformation
test as a “useful and important clue” in determining
patent eligibility of process patents. However, many
commentators have criticized the test for its lack of
39. Id. at 959.
40. Id. (citing In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A.

1978); In re Walter, 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980); In re Abele,
684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).
41. Id.
42. Id. (quoting In re Abele, 684 F.2d at 905–07).
43. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
44. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 959–60.
45. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 3229.
49. Id. at 3231.
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clarity and questioned the properness of its inquiry.50
Court and BPAI decisions since Bilski have created
a patchwork of cases that do provide some clarity on
what “transformation” for patent eligibility requires.
This section summarizes the major themes of
decisions using and analyzing the “transformation”
prong to determine patent eligibility after Bilski.
A.

What is an “Article”?

First, courts and the BPAI have closely
scrutinized the arguably transformed “article” while
applying the machine-or-transformation test. This
paper argues that the courts and BPAI have done
so properly because, as the Federal Circuit stated
in In re Bilski, “[p]urported transformations or
manipulations simply of public or private legal
obligations or relationships, business risks, or other
such abstractions cannot meet the test because
they are not physical objects or substances, and
they are not representative of physical objects or
substances.”51 In Accenture Global Services v.
Guidewire Software,52 the District Court of Delaware
found that “file notes,” which include “damages
incurred to vehicles and real property, and/or injuries
sustained by people involved in an accident,” do not
represent “physical and tangible objects” because
these notes may also include information like “cost
of automobile repair, hours worked, or the amount of
medical expenses.”53 Therefore, the court held that
even if this type of data transformed into a tangible
visual display, the visual image would not represent
particular physical articles and, therefore, did not
qualify as a “transformation” under the machine-ortransformation test.54
Similarly, the Federal Circuit held that
deed-shares, i.e., legal ownership interests in
property, could not be transformed through the
claims disclosing an investment tool enabling taxfree exchanges of property in Fort Properties v.
American Master Lease.55 The Federal Circuit
cited Bilski for the proposition that connections
to the physical world—deeds, contracts, and
real property—were insufficient to transform an
abstract concept (a real estate investment tool)
50. Moore, supra note 4; Murphy, supra note 4; Lemley,
supra note 4.
51. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
52. 691 F. Supp. 2d 577, 596 (D. Del. 2010).
53. Id. at 596.
54. Id.
55. Fort Props., Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC, 671 F.3d
1317, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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into patentable subject matter.56 In CLS Bank, the
District Court of the District of Columbia also
refused to find patent eligibility in claims that
exchanged “obligations,” holding that obligations
cannot be transformed because they are “mere
abstraction[s].”57 However, the Federal Circuit
reversed on appeal, holding that the claims were
sufficiently limited to a practical business concept
and implemented with a computer so that the
claims were patent eligible.58 The Federal Circuit
subsequently vacated the decision and granted a
rehearing en banc.59
The BPAI has likewise inquired into whether
claimed articles are physical or tangible objects
capable of satisfying the transformation prong of
the machine-or-transformation test. For example,
in Ex Parte Weisbach60 appellants argued that the
process of transforming a rental of a real venue seat
for a game or a season into an ownership right in the
real venue seat for the life of the venue constituted
a valid transformation.61 The BPAI disagreed and
held that the right to occupy a seat in the venue, like
the deed-shares in Fort Properties, was an abstract
concept representing legal ownership interests.62
Therefore, the ownership interest was incapable
of being transformed, and the invention was not
patentable subject matter.63 The BPAI came to a
similar decision in Ex Parte Ward,64 where it found
that a process for playing a certain card game,
which claimed both “physical playing cards” and
“images of cards,” was too abstract and general to
be considered an article under the transformation
prong.65 Additionally, the BPAI has found that

56. Id.
57. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 768 F. Supp.

2d 221, 233–35 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d, 685 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir.
2012), reh’g en banc granted, 2012 WL 4784336 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
58. Id. at 1356.
59. Id.
60. No. 2010-011353, 2012 WL 760142 (B.P.A.I. Feb. 29,
2012).
61. Id. at *3 (“[A]t the core of the right to occupy a
seat in a stadium is an abstraction, namely, the concept of
ownership.”).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. No. 2010-005500, 2010 WL 4991412 (B.P.A.I. Dec. 6,
2010)
65. Id. at *5 (noting that the claimed method was so
sweeping as to cover “both known and unknown uses of the
concept and be performed through any existing or futuredevised machinery”).
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“patient information”66 and an “archive”67 have not
satisfied the tangible or physical article requirement

and therefore the machine-or-transformation test.68
Nevertheless, the BPAI decided a transformation
of a virtual object did occur in Ex Parte Ng-ThowHing.69 There, the claimed process included a
step for determining a value for each parameter
by optimizing an objective function, which,
according to the BPAI, resulted in a valid physical
transformation of a virtual skeleton.70 The dissenting
opinion, however, disagreed and pointed out that a
computer model, not an actual physical skeleton,
was being transformed, so the application should not
have passed the machine-or-transformation test.71
B.

What is a “Transformation”?

After the courts and BPAI have determined
that the claimed process affects a physical “article,”
they next closely examine the claims and attempt
to distinguish transformations from unpatentable
algorithms. Courts have found the mere transfer
or copying of data to be generally insufficient
to satisfy this inquiry. For example, the Central
District of California found Ultramercial’s method
of downloading an advertisement on the memory
of the personal computer of the consumer to be
a mere transfer of data from one memory disk to
another.72 The court found that the transfer did not
change the data in any way and therefore did not
constitute a transformation of an article.73 Similarly,

66. Ex Parte Starkey, No. 2010-007809, 2011 WL
4434501, at *4 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 20, 2011) (explaining that
transferring patient information into an application is the “mere
transfer” of information, not a true transformation).
67. Ex Parte Subbu, No. 2010-001444, 2011 WL 6739373,
at *3 (B.P.A.I. Dec. 21, 2011) (holding that an “archive” is not
even a physical “article” within the meaning of § 101).

68. Id.; Ex Parte Starkey, No. 2010-007809, 2011 WL
4434501, at *4.
69. No. 2009-009095, 2011 WL 341359, at *1–2 (B.P.A.I.
Feb. 1, 2011) (“[Claim 1 states: a] method for producing a
subject-specific skeleton from an external measurement data
set and a generic skeleton, the generic skeleton comprising a
plurality of parameters, the method comprising: determining
a set of parameters, wherein the set includes a first parameter
related to a size of a bone segment in a first dimension and
a second parameter related to a size of the bone segment
in a second dimension; applying, for the set of parameters,
correspondence between the external measurement data set and
the generic skeleton; and determining, for each parameter in
the set, a value, by optimizing an objective function.”).
70. Id. at *2.
71. Id. at *3–4 (arguing that a computer model is not a
particular “article” that is being transformed into a different
state).
72. Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, CV 09-06918
RGK, 2010 WL 3360098 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2010) appeal
reinstated, 413 F. App’x 276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) and rev’d, 657
F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011) and dismissed, 457 F. App’x 920
(Fed. Cir. 2011), order recalled and vacated, 413 F. App’x 276
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
73. Id. at *5 (explaining that “[a] method . . . wherein
media product assessed by the consumer is downloaded to a
memory of a personal computer of the consumer” is simply a
data transfer between two computers).
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the District Court of New Jersey held that a process
of extracting information from a document or filing,
formatting, and transmitting it to an application
program was also a “mere transfer” of data in
Glory Licensing.74 Furthermore, changing the
files’ formatting did not sufficiently qualify as a
transformation.75 However, in VS Technologies v.
Twitter,76 the Eastern District of Virginia refused
to grant Twitter’s motion for summary judgment
on the patent eligibility of a process that formatted
raw data so that knowledgeable or skilled people
in a particular area could interact with others and
discuss relevant topics in their particular field in
real time.77 In VS Technologies, the court decided
that a reasonable juror could find that the formatting
process transformed an article into a different state
or thing.78
Courts have also deemed collecting,
comparing, analyzing, and classifying data as
non-transformations. In CyberSource v. Retail
Decisions,79 the Federal Circuit held that the patent
application failed the transformation prong of the
test because the claimed process consisted of a
“mere collection and organization of data regarding
credit card numbers and Internet addresses.”80 In
the biotechnology context, the BPAI decided that
a process of comparing gene expression profiles,
listing them in clusters, and providing an output
of the listing did not transform any article under
the machine-or-transformation test in Ex Parte
Kelkar.81 The Federal Circuit similarly decided that
a method comparing and analyzing DNA sequences
constitutes an abstract mental process and thus was

not a transformation in Association for Molecular
Pathology.82 This process did not include any steps
of extracting or sequencing DNA,83 unlike Myriad’s
other valid method claims that involved growing
cells and determining cell growth rates to screen
potential cancer therapies.84
Courts and the BPAI have also viewed
processes that update, store, compute, convert,
decode, evaluate, and select data as lacking a
transformation because the underlying data or
information is, again, left unchanged. For example,
the process of using a claim “namespace” or
“simplified scheme” to decode an XML-based
document did not constitute a transformation
in Ex Parte Heuer.85 Nor did a process claim
where content from one forum resource to
another discussion forum resource qualify as a
transformation in Ex Parte Banatwala.86 The BPAI
characterized this as merely copying data from
one place to another.87 Additionally, in Ex Parte
Ward,88 the BPAI held that changing the position
or location of playing cards was an insufficient
transformation for patent eligibility, if the change
was a transformation at all.89 Similarly, in Ex Parte
Caccavale,90 the patent application was aimed at
“collect[ing] performance parameters from the
Internet servers in order to determine a measure
of system performance, and . . . trigger[ing] an
alarm when the measure of system performance
indicates a presence of system degradation.”91
The BPAI boiled this down to merely statistical
analysis computations, which did not constitute

74. Glory Licensing LLC v. Toys R Us, Inc., CIV. 094252 FSH, 2011 WL 1870591, at *4 (D.N.J. May 16, 2011)
(explaining that the transfer of a file is not a “transformation”
equivalent to turning “raw data into a particular visual
depiction of a physical object on a display”).
75. Id.
76. 2:11CV43, 2011 WL 4744911 (E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2011).
77. Id. at *46 (E.D. Va. Oct. 5, 2011) (suggesting that
when the transfer of data allows a user to do something new
with the data, i.e. “[create] the ability for people to interact in
real time,” data is likely transformed for the purposes of § 101).
78. Id. at *5–6.
79. 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
80. Id. at 1370 (“The district court found that claim 3 fails
to meet either prong of the machine-or-transformation test. . .
. We agree. As the district court correctly held, the method of
claim 3 simply requires one to “obtain and compare intangible
data pertinent to business risks. . . . The mere collection and
organization of data regarding credit card numbers and Internet
addresses is insufficient to meet the transformation prong of the
test.”) (citations omitted).
81. Ex Parte Kelkar, No. 2009-004635, 2010 WL
3768175, at *2 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 24, 2010).

82. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329, 1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 2011),
reh’g denied (Sept. 13, 2011), reh’g denied (Sept. 16, 2011),
cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012)
opinion vacated, appeal reinstated, 2010-1406, 2012 WL
1500104, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 30, 2012) aff’d 386 F.3d 1303,
1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
83. Id. at 1356.
84. Id. at 1357–58 (explaining that the additional step of
“growing” cells, and “determining” growth rates were physical
manipulations central to the claimed process).
85. Ex Parte Heuer, No. 2009–004590, 2010 WL
3072973, at *8 (B.P.A.I. Aug. 4, 2010).
86. No. 2009–006785, 2010 WL 4250887 (B.P.A.I. Oct.
18, 2010).
87. Id. at *3.
88. No. 2010–005500, 2010 WL 4991412 (B.P.A.I. Dec.
6, 2010).
89. Id. at *3.
90. No. 2009–006026, 2010 WL 2901727 (B.P.A.I. July
23, 2010).
91. Id. at *1.
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a transformation for patent eligibility purposes.92
A process of updating a “statistical indicator”
after “calculating a particular ratio” also failed to
constitute a transformation in Ex Parte Foulger.93

seemingly more intertwined with the patented
processes.
In Ultramercial v. Hulu, the Central District
of California noted that the storing of content on
the consumer’s computer memory could qualify as
C.
When is a Transformation 			 a transformation, although the Court was skeptical
	Central to the Claims?
that what was stored in a computer memory changed
its nature.98 However, even if this storage qualifies
The machine-or-transformation test requires
as a transformation, the court found it as “merely
that the transformation be “central” to the claimed
incidental” to the claimed process of exchanging
process.94 Hence, courts have found that some
watching advertisements with no-cost media
transformations that occur during a claimed process
access.99 Likewise, in CLS Bank, the District Court
are merely incidental to the claims and do not
of D.C. decided that the electronic transformation
95
satisfy the transformation prong of the test. The
of data, on a microscopic level, constituted an
electronic transformation of data on a hard drive
incidental transformation and represented an
has been generally viewed as merely incidental to
“insignificant extra-solution activity” to the claimed
the claimed process and failing the transformation
method of electronically adjusting bank accounts.100
prong in software patent applications.96 However,
The court explained that the purpose of the method
physiological and biological transformations
was to exchange obligations, not to electronically
are rarely, if ever, incidental to claims.97 This
transform a hard drive or computer memory.101
divergence could be based on a difference in how
Furthermore, if the electronic transformation
courts approach the analysis of a software patent
was indeed sufficient to pass the machine-orversus a biotechnology patent, or perhaps the
transformation test, the court worried that almost
difference in the nature of the patented inventions
any method using a general-purpose computer or
themselves—i.e., biological transformations are
electronic device with memory could receive patent
protection.102
In the biotechnology field, courts have
92. Id. at *3.
93. Ex Parte Foulger, No. 2009-007619, 2010 WL
more readily found the biological transformation as
5244744, at *3 (B.P.A.I. Dec. 22, 2010); see also Ex Parte
“central” to the claim scope and, therefore, that the
Vishnubhotla, No. 2009-008510, 2011 WL 126897, at *4
claimed method qualifies as patent eligible—at least
(B.P.A.I. Jan. 13, 2011) (“‘[U]pdating the database with
data from the file of interest upon receipt of the database
before the Supreme Court decided Prometheus.103
trigger’ [does not] qualify as a transformation of an article of
For example, in Acorda Therapeutics v. Apotex,104
manufacture in accordance with the transformation prong of
Acorda attempted to patent a method for treating
the machine-or-transformation test.”); Ex Parte Subbu, No.
2010-001444, 2011 WL 6739373, at *4 (B.P.A.I. Dec. 21,
patients using a specific drug.105 The defendant,
2011) (“[S]tep (c) does no more than ‘commit’ allocations
Apotex, argued that performing the method only
to the archive and step (i) ‘updates’ the archive with new
allocations. We are unable to discern and the Appellants do not required prescribing and dispensing the drug,
explain in what way an ‘archive’ is transformed into a different which meant the process was merely mental.106
state or thing as a result of these operations.”).
Nevertheless, the District Court of New Jersey held
94. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (“A claimed
that the patent required the administration of the
process is patent-eligible if it transforms an article into a
drug, as well as “the giving, dosing, self-dosing, or
different state or thing. This transformation must be central to
the purpose of the claimed process.”); In re Bilski, 545 F.3d
taking of the composition resulting in ‘a peak plasma
943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
95. See, e.g., Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, CV 0906918 RGK, 2010 WL 3360098, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 13,
2010), appeal reinstated, 413 F. App’x 276 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
and rev’d, 657 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011), and dismissed, 457
F. App’x 920, order recalled and vacated, 413 F. App’x 276
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that electronic transformation of
data was merely incidental to the claims and therefore did not
satisfy the machine-or-transformation test).
96. Id.
97. See, e.g., Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo
Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1355–56 (Fed. Cir.
2010) cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3027 (U.S. 2011); Classen
Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 F.3d 1057, 1068
(Fed.Cir.2011).

98. Ultramercial, 2010 WL 3360098, at *1.
99. Id.
100. CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 768 F. Supp.

2d 221, 235 (D.D.C. 2011).
101. Id. at 234–35.
102. Id.
103. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
104. CIV.A. No. 07–4937 GEB-M, 2011 WL 4074116
(D.N.J. Sept. 6, 2011).
105. Id. at *1.
106. Id.
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tizanidine concentration earlier than about [four]
hours from administration’ or similar limitation.”107
Therefore, the patent required a transformation in the
form of a physiological effect on the human body
and satisfied the machine-or-transformation test.108
The patent in Prometheus claimed a method
comprised of: administering a particular drug to
a patient, determining the metabolite level in the
patient’s blood, and then warning the treating
physician if the drug dosage was too high or
too low.109 The Federal Circuit decided that this
method qualified as patent eligible because the
administration of the drug created a physiological
transformation within the patient’s body, and the
determining step transformed the patient’s blood
sample in the process.110 These transformations
were central to the process because without the body
metabolizing the drug or the blood being analyzed,
the physician could not know if the dosage was too
high or too low.111 Moreover, the Federal Circuit
stated that this patent was not claiming a law of
nature, i.e., a correlation between metabolite levels
and toxicity, but rather a particular application of
naturally occurring correlations.112 However, the
Supreme Court reversed this decision, as discussed
below.113
In Association for Molecular Pathology v.
U.S. Patent & Trademark Office,114 Myriad Genetics,
Inc. claimed a process for identifying cancer
therapeutics which involved growing cells with
an altered cancer gene, with or without a potential
cancer therapeutic, followed by determining
and comparing the cells’ growth rate.115 The
Federal Circuit found that this process physically
manipulated the cells. Moreover, this manipulation
was necessary to identify different substances
potential use as therapeutic agents, making the
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs.,

628 F.3d 1347, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct.
3027 (2011).
110. Id. at 1355–56.
111. Id. at 1357.
112. Id. at 1355.
113. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
114. 653 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g denied, (Sept.
13, 2011), reh’g denied, (Sept. 16, 2011), cert. granted,
judgment vacated sub nom, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1794 (2012), and opinion
vacated and appeal reinstated, 467 F. App’x 890 (Fed. Cir.
2012).
115. Id. 1357–58.
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physical transformation central to the claim scope.116
The court added that the patent was not claiming a
scientific principle because it was tied to specific
types of cells, cancer genes, and therapeutics.117
Finally, in Classen Immunotherapies, Inc.
v. Biogen Idec,118 the District Court of Maryland
held that a patent claiming a process of immunizing
patients according to published schedules to prevent
chronic immune mediated disorders did not qualify
as patent eligible.119 The district court applied
the machine-or-transformation test and found that
the physiological transformation of the patient’s
body after immunization was “insignificant postsolution activity.”120 Therefore, the transformation
was not sufficient to pass this prong of the test,
and the patentee was trying to patent a natural
phenomenon.121 The Federal Circuit affirmed
this holding on appeal,122 but the Supreme Court
remanded the case in light of its decision in Bilski.123
On remand, the Federal Circuit reversed its previous
ruling and found the patent valid under § 101.124
The Federal Circuit cited Prometheus as supporting
the patent eligibility of method claims that included
a transformative immunization.125
116. Id.
117. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 653 F.3d at 1358.
118. CIVIL No. WDQ-04-2607, 2006 WL 6161856 (D.

Md. Aug. 16, 2006), aff’d, 304 F. App’x 866 (Fed. Cir. 2008),
cert. granted, judgment vacated, 130 S. Ct. 3541 (U.S. 2010),
and aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 659 F.3d 1057
(Fed. Cir. 2011).
119. Id. at *1.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 304
F. App’x 866 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. granted, judgment vacated,
130 S. Ct. 3541 (2010).
123. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 130
S. Ct. 3541 (2010).
124. Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659
F.3d 1057, 1059 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
125. Id. at 1068 (“Classen also argues that the claims of
all three patents meet the machine-or-transformation test of
this court’s vacated In re Bilski opinion, citing Prometheus
Laboratories, supra, where this court held that ‘claims to
methods of treatment are always transformative when one
of a defined group of drugs is administered to the body
to ameliorate the effects of an undesired condition.’ On
the materially different facts in Prometheus and in the
Classen specifications, the analogy is inapt, for the claims in
Prometheus are for a method of controlling individualized
dosages of a specific drug by measuring its metabolic products
in the blood of individual patients, while the Classen patents
operate on published information to determine general
immunization schedules. The principles applied in Prometheus
support the patent eligibility of the Classen claims that include
such transformative steps, but are not relevant to claims that
require no more than referring to known information but do
not include immunization in light of that information. Viewing
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IV.

“Failure” of the Machine-orTransformation Test: Abstract Ideas
versus Laws of Nature

As the Supreme Court noted in Bilski, the
machine-or-transformation test, despite being
non-dispositive, still provides helpful guidance
in determining patent eligibility.126 Courts have
continued to perform the machine-or-transformation
test since Bilski but have had to further determine
whether the process as a whole is directed to an
abstract idea.127 However, some processes may fail
the test but still be patent eligible128 or vice versa,129
signifying that the test is both over- and underinclusive. Patents involving abstract ideas and laws
of nature seem to diverge at this point. Although
neither the Supreme Court nor any other court has
explicitly distinguished separate analyses for patent
eligibility based on whether the process involved an
abstract idea or law of nature, recent cases suggest
that the characteristics of abstract ideas and laws of
nature require different considerations.130 Through
a patchwork of opinions since Bilski, the test is now
under-inclusive of Information Age technologies
that utilize abstract ideas to push forward computer
technology.131 Additionally, the test is overinclusive of processes that operate via laws of
nature because the transformation involved may be
a guise for patenting a natural phenomenon, instead
of its application.132 As courts continue to use the
machine-or-transformation test to understand patent
eligibility, it is important to examine whether a
patent deals with an abstract idea or a law of nature.
The next section analyzes two cases where the test
the representative claims of the Classen patents in accordance
with their purported scope, we conclude that the claims of
the 8139 and 8739 patents reason-ably meet the threshold
of § 101 eligibility, and that analysis of the subject matter of
these claims, and other claims in these patents, should proceed
by way of the statutory criteria of patentability.”) (citations
omitted).
126. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010).
127. See, e.g., Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d
1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
128. See id.
129. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs.,
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 (2012).
130. Eisenberg, Wisdom of the Ages or Dead–Hand
Control? Patentable Subject Matter for Diagnostic Methods
After In re Bilski, 3 Case W. Res. J.L. Tech. & Internet 1,
85-86 (forthcoming, 2012), available at http://www.patentlyo.
com/ files/eisenberg.wisdomordeadhand.patentlyo.pdf (last
visited Mar. 25, 2012).
131. See Ultramercial, 657 F.3d at 1323.
132. See Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1289.

was inadequate and the courts attempted to resolve
this disparity.
A.

Abstract Ideas and Ultramercial

In Ultramercial v. Hulu, the Federal Circuit
reversed the district court’s holding of patent
ineligibility due to the claimed process’s failure
under the machine-or-transformation test.133 The
court stated that the patent “claims a particular
method for collecting revenue from the distribution
of media products over the Internet.”134 Although
the process is a practical application of the general
concept of advertising as currency, it also required
more than mental steps because of the controlled
interaction with consumers on the Internet.135 The
court viewed the interaction with the consumer
via the Internet as transforming the method from
an abstract idea to a specific application of that
idea, making it patent eligible without any physical
transformation.136
The Federal Circuit’s decision in
Ultramercial to uphold the validity of a process that
failed the machine-or-transformation test begs the
question of why this invention differs from all other
inventions after Bilski that have failed the machineor-transformation test and have been subsequently
deemed patent ineligible. This decision is therefore
important in understanding areas where the machineor-transformation test does not accurately indicate
patent eligible subject matter. The Federal Circuit
has distinguished Ultramercial from a subsequent
case, Fort Properties, by explaining that the former
dealt with “advances in computer technology,”
while the latter simply claimed a “computer-aided”
algorithm.137 Therefore, the Federal Circuit seemed
to declare—and lower courts have followed the
idea—that the machine-or-transformation test
insufficiently determines whether an advance
in computer technology qualifies as patentable.
However, this test appropriately weeds out
algorithms merely performed with a computer.138
657 F.3d at 1323.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Compare Ultramercial, 657 F.3d at 1323 (finding
patent-eligible subject matter even though the software did
not pass the machine-or-transformation test), with Fort Props.,
Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC, 671 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(finding patent ineligible subject matter after the software did
not pass the machine-or-transformation test).
138. See Fort Props., Inc., 671 F.3d at 1317, 1323
(“‘Simply adding a ‘computer aided’ limitation to a claim
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
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It is unclear what exactly pulls an invention
from the computer-aided-process realm to the
advance-in-computer-technology realm. The Federal
Circuit stated that Ultramercial’s invention was
patent eligible because it required complex computer
programming, was not drawn to purely mental
processes, and greatly improved previous computer
technology.139 Moreover, the claim scope had
meaningful limitations because the patent could not
be performed without a computer and a controlled
interaction with the customer.140 On the other hand,
in Fort Properties, the Federal Circuit held that the
patent in question was merely an investment tool
implemented with a computer.141 An investment
tool was an abstract concept and more of a mental
process that did not require complex computer
programming.142 Moreover, the claim scope was
not meaningfully limited with the process’s use of a
computer.143 Thus, the Federal Circuit felt this was
an example of a “computer-aided” process that did
not deserve patent protection.144
As seen in Part II, courts and the BPAI had
been fairly restrictive in applying the machineor-transformation test after In re Bilski, requiring
physical steps to satisfy the test.145 Although a noncovering an abstract concept, without more, is insufficient to
render the claim patent eligible.’ Dealertrack distinguished
itself from Ultramercial on the grounds that its claims
‘recite[d] only that the method [was] ‘computer aided’
without specifying any level of involvement or detail,’ while
the Ultramercial claims required ‘an extensive computer
interface.’”).
139. Ultramercial, 657 F.3d at 1328 (“Many of these
steps are likely to require intricate and complex computer
programming. In addition, certain of these steps clearly
require specific application to the Internet and a cyber-market
environment. One clear example is the third step, ‘providing
said media products for sale on an Internet website.’ And,
of course, if the products are offered for sale on the Internet,
they must be ‘restricted’—step four—by complex computer
programming as well. Viewing the subject matter as a whole,
the invention involves an extensive computer interface. This
court does not define the level of programming complexity
required before a computer-implemented method can be
patent-eligible. Nor does this court hold that use of an Internet
website to practice such a method is either necessary or
sufficient in every case to satisfy § 101. This court simply
finds the claims here to be patent-eligible, in part because of
these factors.”) (citations omitted).
140. Id. at 1330 (“Unlike the claims in CyberSource, the
claims here require, among other things, controlled interaction
with a consumer via an Internet website, something far
removed from purely mental steps.”).
141. Fort Props., Inc., 671 F.3d at 1317, 1322.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1323.
144. Id. at 1324.
145. Lemley, supra note 4, at 1324–25, 1338.
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physical transformation might be hard to imagine,
perhaps Ultramercial is one of the situations where
it does satisfy the machine-or-transformation test,
but not in the concrete way described by courts.
The decision in Ultramercial is consistent with the
Federal Circuit’s opinion in In re Bilski, where the
court held that physical steps are not needed to pass
the machine-or-transformation test.146
A few cases decided since Ultramercial have
followed this line of reasoning. The Eastern District
of Virginia took a step away from the physicality
requirement of the machine-or-transformation test in
VS Technologies v. Twitter.147 In VS Technologies,
the patent claimed a process of formatting of data
to create a forum for people to discuss and interact
in real-time.148 Like in Ultramercial, the process
created something tangible to the consumer via the
Internet from raw data very different from the end
product.149 The court in VS Technologies denied the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment because a
reasonable juror could find that the patented process
satisfied the machine-or-transformation test even
without a physical transformation.150 Similarly,
the Eastern District of California,151 the Southern
District of New York,152 and the Eastern District of
Texas153 denied a defendant’s motion for summary
judgment in a software process patent case because
a reasonable juror could find the invention patent
eligible even though no physical transformation
occurred. Perhaps courts are opening up to the idea
that transformations in the computer technology
field do not always have to be physical when the
overall invention moves technology further and are
learning how to better separate these inventions from
those in Bilski.
B.

Laws of Nature and Prometheus

On May 20, 2012, the Supreme Court
reversed the Federal Circuit’s decision in
146. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 961 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
147. 2:11CV43, 2011 WL 4744572, at *1 (E.D. Va. Oct. 5,

2011).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Iconfind, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 2:11-CV-0319-GEBJFM, 2012 WL 158366, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2012).
152. Island Intellectual Prop. LLC v. Deutsche Bank AG,
09 CIV. 2675 KBF, 2012 WL 386282, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6,
2012).
153. Prompt Med. Sys., L.P. v. Allscriptsmysis Healthcare
Solutions, Inc., 6:10-CV-71, 2012 WL 678216, at *1 (E.D. Tex.
Feb. 13, 2012).
148.
149.
150.
151.
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Prometheus.154 The Court held Prometheus’s
patents ineligible because they did not significantly
claim anything more than a law of nature.155 The
Court examined each step of the claimed process,
explaining that each step was not a law of nature
and also not enough to transform the nature of the
claim.156 According to the Court, the first step of
“administering” the drugs merely involved the
preexisting audience of doctors who treat patients
with autoimmune disorders.157 Moreover, the
Court cited Bilski for the proposition that this was
not a meaningful limitation to the laws of nature
because limiting the use of the abstract idea or law
of nature to a particular technological environment
could not be used to “circumvent” the exclusion
of patenting abstract ideas.158 The second step of
the process, called the “wherein” clause, simply
informed the physician of the laws of nature and
trusts her to apply it appropriately.159 The third
step of “determining” the metabolite levels in
the blood merely instructed the physician to use
whatever known process she preferred to determine
the metabolite levels.160 The Court declared this
step conventional and routine for scientists in the
field, and “‘conventional or obvious’ ‘[pre]-solution
activity’ was normally not sufficient to transform
an unpatentable law of nature into a patent-eligible
application of such a law.”161 Finally, the Court
examined the method as a whole and held that the
combination of steps does not add anything more
to the laws of nature than when each step was
considered separately.162 Therefore, the steps were
not sufficient to constitute patentable applications of
unpatentable natural correlations.163
154. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, Inc.,
132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
155. Id. at 1291.
156. Id. at 1298.
157. Id. at 1297.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1297–98.
161. Id. at 1298.
162. Id.
163. Id. (“The upshot is that the three steps simply tell
doctors to gather data from which they may draw an inference
in light of the correlations. To put the matter more succinctly,
the claims inform a relevant audience about certain laws of
nature; any additional steps consist of well-understood, routine,
conventional activity already engaged in by the scientific
community; and those steps, when viewed as a whole, add
nothing significant beyond the sum of their parts taken
separately. For these reasons we believe that the steps are not
sufficient to transform unpatentable natural correlations into
patentable applications of those regularities.”).

The Supreme Court also discussed the
machine-or-transformation test briefly in its
opinion.164 The Court seemed skeptical that the
process recited meaningful transformations.165
According to the Court, the “administering” step
merely selected the group of people interested in
applying the law of nature.166 Furthermore, the
“determining” step did not require a transformation
to occur if science developed a completely new
system for determining the metabolite levels.167 The
Court then proceeded to cite Bilski in asserting that
the machine-or-transformation test was only an
“important and useful clue” to the § 101 inquiry and
stated that the test failed here.168
Although the machine-or-transformation
test faced criticism for its lack of applicability to
Information Age inventions because of its supposed
physicality requirement,169 Prometheus exposed the
shortcomings of the test as currently applied in the
biotechnology industry as well. The Supreme Court
has never defined “law of nature” or “abstract idea,”
but the former is inherently tied to physical, tangible
objects in the real world while the latter is not
because a law of nature is discovered in the universe
and an abstract idea is created from one’s mind
and imagination.170 Laws of nature are inherently
Id. at 1303.
Id.
Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1303.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Ben McEniery, Physicality and the
Information Age: A Normative Perspective on the Patent
Eligibility of Non-Physical Methods, 10 Chi.-Kent J. Intell.
Prop. 106, 133–34 (2010) (“As Judge Rader noted in dissent
in In re Bilski, the Federal Circuit’s machine-or-transformation
test propagates unanswerable questions surrounding the
extent and degree of physicality needed. Dispensing with
the physicality requirement avoids those difficult and
arbitrary questions. It removes from the patent eligibility
analysis difficult questions such as: What form or amount
of ‘transformation’ is needed? When is a transformation of
data that is ‘representative’ of a physical object sufficiently
linked to that object to satisfy the transformation test? What,
in theory and in practice, is the material difference between
data ‘representative’ of a physical object and data which are
not? What link to a machine is sufficient to invoke patent
eligibility? Is a general purpose computer running a software
program a ‘specific machine?’ If under United States law, §
101 recognizes ‘machines’ as a category of patentable subject
matter, why does the ‘process’ category require a machine
prong, and if it does, what connection with a machine is
necessary? Does the machine prong of the machine-ortransformation test require that a process be a machine or that it
merely involve or rely on the use of a machine?”).
170. This is not to say that abstract ideas cannot also
be tied to tangible objects in the world. See, e.g., Bilski
v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) (holding that the
invention was an abstract idea tied to real-world objects).
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
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transformative because, by definition, they recite
recurring facts or events in the physical world.171
Although some commentators do not agree with the
Supreme Court that the correlation in Prometheus
is in fact a law of nature because it requires medical
intervention to occur,172 this paper does assume that
the correlation is a law of nature. To determine
whether a patentee is trying to claim an entire law
of nature or just its application, the machine-ortransformation test no longer seems to be a useful
tool after Prometheus because the presence or
absence of a “transformation” in the process does
not distinguish the two.
Breyer’s opinion noted that methods of
treatment would still be patentable, in contrast to
Prometheus’s patent.173 He stated that a method
of treatment differed from the Prometheus patent
because a method of treatment adds significant
steps to the law of nature, taking the invention
from the law of nature itself to an application of
nature.174 Conceptually, the difference is hard to
actually understand. Both processes would consist
of the same transformative step of administering the
drug to a patient whose body then metabolizes it
according to a law of nature. The resulting toxicity
or ineffectiveness from a drug metabolite level
seems conceptually similar to a particular health
outcome caused by a drug metabolite.
However, a difference between the two
types of processes exists in the timing and nature
of the transformations involved. In Prometheus,
the Supreme Court characterizes the invention
as a mere correlation between a drug metabolite
171. See Law of nature, Britannica Online Encyclopedia,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/ 406522/lawof-nature (last visited October 21, 2012) (describing a law of
nature as a universal order in natural phenomena).
172. Robert R. Sachs, Punishing Prometheus: The
Supreme Court’s Blunders in Mayo v. Prometheus, Patently-O
(Mar. 26, 2012, 9:10 AM), http://www.patentlyo.com/
patent/2012/03/punishing-prometheus-the-supreme-courtsblunders-in-mayo-v-prometheus.html. But see Prometheus,
132 S. Ct. at 1297 (“While it takes a human action (the
administration of a thiopurine drug) to trigger a manifestation
of this relation in a particular person, the relation itself exists
in principle apart from any human action. The relation is a
consequence of the ways in which thiopurine compounds are
metabolized by the body—entirely natural processes. And so
a patent that simply describes that relation sets forth a natural
law.”).
173. Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1302 (“For here, as we
have said, the steps add nothing of significance to the natural
laws themselves. Unlike, say, a typical patent on a new drug or
a new way of using an existing drug, the patent claims do not
confine their reach to particular applications of those laws.”).
174. Id.
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and toxicity/ineffectiveness, which contains no
inherent transformation.175 The Court noted
that transformations that occurred in the process
resulted from conventional steps added to the law
of nature.176 The use of the drug for treating the
condition, the process of the body metabolizing the
drug, and the administering and determining steps
were all known in the prior art or are obvious to
someone skilled in the art.177 On the other hand,
with a patent for a method of treatment, the use
of the drug for a particular health outcome in the
patient constitutes the invention. A transformation
occurs when the body uses this drug to help the
patient’s condition in some way, which is what is
being invented. This transformation is not novel or
obvious because this is the heart of the invention.
The transformation in Prometheus should be
classified as “merely incidental” to the claimed
invention and therefore insufficient for patent
eligibility. Although the machine-or-transformation
test effectively invalidates unpatentable algorithms
that simply require a computer for performance,178
the test fails in detecting unpatentable laws of
nature embedded in conventional and insignificant
transformations, like in Prometheus.
This approach to determining a
transformation, however, arguably takes into account
other criteria for patentability, especially novelty,
nonobviousness, and claim scope. Courts have
deemed § 101 a separate criterion for patentability,
but courts must focus on what the invention is to
determine if it is patent eligible. Additionally, in
order to determine what the invention is, the patent
application must be examined in these ways to
determine what the heart of the actual invention is
and look beyond any evasive drafting techniques like
the Supreme Court did in Prometheus. Therefore,
the other requirements for patentability are implicitly
linked in any patent eligibility discussion, and this
does not seem improper. The subject matter inquiry
remains a separate question using distinct criteria
from others. For example, this patent applications
inquiry does not impose a requisite level of novelty
175. Id. at 1296 (“Prometheus’ patents set forth laws
of nature—namely, relationships between concentrations
of certain metabolites in the blood and the likelihood that a
dosage of a thiopurine drug will prove ineffective or cause
harm.”).
176. Id. at 1299–1300.
177. Id. at 1297.
178. See, e.g., Fort Props., Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC,
671 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that the computer
program for a real estate investment tool failed the machine-ortransformation test and was patent ineligible).
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or nonobviousness. Rather, a particular departure
from laws of nature is required, which can only be
achieved by distinguishing the law of nature from
the invention and examining the separation between
the two concepts. Under the transformation prong
of the machine-or-transformation test, this departure
from the underlying law of nature can be achieved
through the inventive process’s transformation of
an article. The Prometheus Court was bothered by
the notion that the transformation could simply be
a law of nature, as evidenced by its holding that the
transformation must have qualified as inventive as
well.
V.

Conclusion

The machine-or-transformation test after
Bilski has been interpreted with enough consistency
and rigidity to provide certainty but also allows
some room for technology-specific application.
With patents involving abstract ideas (like computer
technology), the transformation analysis will
usually provide the correct result. As discussed in
Part III, requiring (1) transformation of a physical
object, (2) a transformation to be more than just
a simple algorithm or transfer of data, and (3) the
insignificance of post-solution activity—like the
electronic transformation of data—are each very
important thresholds that will prevent mathematical
formula and other computer processes from being
patentable. These unpatentable processes are
important to determine what qualifies as patent
ineligible because they would otherwise be clearly
ineligible as abstract ideas without implementation
on a general purpose computer, but with these
processes, they can be easily disguised as processes
that are patent eligible.
However, as in Ultramercial, the
transformation analysis may also deem processes
ineligible that strongly deserve patent protection.
If a court determines that a computer technology
patent is patent ineligible under the “traditional”
transformation analysis, the inquiry should then
shift to determine whether the invention is merely
a computer-aided algorithm—and therefore patent
ineligible—or an advance in computer technology,
which is patent eligible. Advances in computer
technology should be considered transformative,
even though such processes may not fit into the
normal transformation framework. Transformations
in these processes should be found in the processes’
improvements to existing computer technology,

thereby transforming the technology.
With patents involving laws of nature
(such as biotechnology patents), courts should first
perform the transformation analysis as done with
patents involving abstract ideas and described in Part
III. If the patent appears to pass the transformation
prong at that point, an additional inquiry is needed
as to whether the transformation is inventive or
whether it is the result of a series of conventional
steps aiming to disguise a law of nature as a
patentable process. After Prometheus, courts should
start closely scrutinizing these transformations that
are easily connected to laws of nature to determine
if they are merely incidental to the invention. If
so, and the only inventive concept left is the law of
nature, then the invention must be deemed ineligible.
However, if the transformation using the
law of nature is part of the invention, i.e., the
transformation is novel and nonobvious, then the
process should be patent eligible. For example,
in a method of treatment patent that claims a
process for using a known drug for a new purpose,
the method would be patent eligible because the
transformation of the body with the drug to treat a
particular disease was not known or obvious. In
comparison, the patent in Prometheus is not patent
eligible because the drug’s transformative effect on
a person’s body was already known, and only the
correlation between metabolite levels and the drug’s
toxicity/ineffectiveness were not, which is not by
itself a transformation. If conventional steps must
be performed—e.g., administering and determining,
like in Prometheus—for a transformation to
occur, this transformation should be considered
not central to the claims. Such insignificant postsolution activity should be considered insufficient
to transform the invention into patent eligible
subject matter. This secondary inquiry for patents
involving laws of nature differs greatly from that
of patents involving abstract ideas. But these two
different secondary inquiries allow the machineor-transformation test to strike a balance between
being flexible enough to accurately determine patent
eligibility and retaining its certainty and consistency.
As demonstrated in this paper, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Bilski and subsequent decisions
have created a patchy understanding of what
constitutes a patentable “process” under §101,
despite the Federal Circuit’s attempt to add certainty
and clarity to the jurisprudence of patent eligibility
with its machine-or-transformation test in In re
Bilski. As the transformation analysis clarifies a
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need for a physical change on a physical object—
or data representing one—that is significant and
necessary to the claims, a necessary divergence
between abstract ideas and laws of nature seems
to exist in the analysis. While the machine-ortransformation test aptly deems computer-aided
algorithms patent ineligible, advances in computer
technology that should be eligible are declared to
the contrary because of their lack of physicality.
Meanwhile, biotechnology processes satisfy the
test because of their inherent physicality even
though diagnostic methods now are likely no more
than unpatentable laws of nature in the form of
correlations.
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